On the opposing nationalisms of Russia and Ukraine

Harris (2020) investigates the differing nationalist ideologies developed in Russia and Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia promoted a cross-border kin state identity which justified its interventions across the post-soviet world. In Ukraine, the nation-building project was led by western Ukraine, and it emphasized the region’s Western identity. This narrative excludes eastern Ukrainian culture, whose sense of identity is more closely linked to their Soviet past.

A post-Soviet search for a new self

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a radical reconfiguration of the political landscape, with countries undergoing a parallel process of nation and state-building. Nationalistic discourse involved a re-interpretation of each successor state’s history and identity, with Brubaker (2011) highlighting five common motifs:

1. The idea that each state contains a ‘core’ nation, which differs from the permanent resident population

2. A claim to ownership or primacy of the core nation in the successor state

3. A view that the core nation is being threatened

4. A narrative that action is needed to strengthen the core nation such as promoting its language and political hegemony

5. A claim that supportive state action is needed in order to redress the previous suffering of the core nation

Harris (2020) highlights how the use of these narratives in successor states led to a triadic relationship between national minorities, nationalising states, and external ‘homelands’. The reframing of Soviet-era ethnic conflicts in this new setting led to a renewed wave of conflicts and identity politics.

Russia’s irredentist nationalism

The author begins tracing Russian nationalism in the Soviet period when Russian national identity was neither ethnic nor connected to the territory of the Russian Republic. Instead, it identified with the Soviet proletarian identity, with the national home being the Soviet Union as a whole. In the post-Soviet world, this identity changed, and it became increasingly ethno-linguistic and ethno-national: Russians were viewed to be all people who are ethnically Russian or who speak Russian. This wide, cross-border definition of the Russian nation has been repeatedly used to legitimise Russian interventions in the neighbouring countries, with the ongoing invasion of Ukraine being the most extreme example. Moreover, Russia’s labelling of Ukraine as ‘small Russia’ indicates that while the current Russian identity is more closely attached to ethnic and linguistic characteristics, it retains elements of its Soviet past.

Ukraine’s nationalist discourse split between west and east

Ukraine’s nationalistic discourse retains a strong cultural divide between western and eastern Ukraine, which reflects the regions' different historical experiences. More specifically, Ukrainian nationalism mainly originates in the west, which existed as a separate country and underwent its own nation-building process over the 19th century. On the other hand, eastern Ukrainian identity was primarily linked to the Soviet past. This led to a cultural divide between west and east, with western Ukraine feeling culturally closer to Europe and eastern to Russia.

Russia’s continued influence on Ukrainian political life also affected political discourse in the country. Pro-European and western Ukrainian leaders after the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Maidan Revolution (2013-2014) embarked on the heroization of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), who fought for Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union. At the same time, these organisations’ historical collaboration with the German Nazi regime and their participation in anti-Jewish pogroms led to their labelling as ‘fascists’ in Russia. Consequently, a new ideational division was created, which split Ukraine between a fascist and anti-Russian west, and the pro-Russia east. The partial reliance of the Maidan revolution (2013-2014) on far-right groups further exacerbated this Russian narrative of the Ukrainian political landscape.

Nationalist discourse as an opium for the masses

While Harris (2020) emphasizes the importance of nationalist discourse in justifying country policy, she also highlights how it is often used to cover other materialistic intentions. For example, she argues that Russia’s support of the Donbas insurgency (2014) primarily reflected Russia’s aim to protect its business interests in the area after the fall of the pro-Russian Yanukovych government. Russia, however, framed its intervention only in terms of protecting the local ‘Russian’ population,. In fact, current evidence suggests that Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine is yet another example of when nationalist protection discourse is used to legitimise political power games.